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Introduction
Low paid employment has become a major issue for several industrialised nations in recent years. The rise of earnings inequality experienced in those nations has placed the labour incomes of a growing proportion of the workforce below pre-determined 'decency thresholds', prompting both equity and efficiency concerns (see OECD,1996) .
The Italian labour market also experienced similar trends, with the proportion of low paid workers that has been rising since the mid-1980s and through the first half of the 1990s (see Lucifora, 1998, and Brandolini et al., 2001 ).
The debate provoked by these stylised facts has stressed the need for a dynamic analytical approach, since only the study of low pay mobility -i.e. of movements into and out of low pay over time -can help in identifying the persistently low paid, providing insights on the urgency and targets of policies designed to fight poverty in the labour market.
1 If low paid jobs are a transitory experience of earnings careers, then inequality is shared amongst individual over their life-cycles and policy measures such as minimum wages might increase rigidity at the lower end of the distribution of earnings without any real impact on poverty alleviation. Conversely, pronounced low pay persistence implies that a fraction of the workforce is excluded from the benefits of economic growth in the long run, calling for adequate policy interventions even in the presence of stable cross-sectional distribution over time.
This paper uses panel data on Italian employees over the 1990s and contributes to the existing literature on low pay mobility by estimating models of low pay transition probabilities that are robust to three distinct sources of endogenous selection which might bias this type of analysis. First, proper allowance is made for the endogeneity 3 plaguing dynamic panel data models, an issue that in the context of discrete data investigation has come to be known as the 'initial conditions problem' after the work of Heckman (1981a) . Second, endogenous attrition from the earnings distribution is controlled for. Finally, also educational attainment is allowed to be endogenous when estimating its impact on low pay mobility, thus tackling the problems pointed out by the vast literature investigating the economic returns to education (see e.g. Card, 1999) . The three selection processes and low pay transitions are estimated simultaneously, using multivariate probabilistic models to allow for unobserved heterogeneity.
As for other analyses of individual dynamic outcomes, the assessment of state dependence -the extent to which current states depend upon past ones -is crucial for understanding the mechanisms that generate low pay persistence (Heckman, 1981b) . At one extreme, persistence could be induced by individual (observed and unobserved) heterogeneity: in such a circumstance, it is (the lack of) some persistent personal attribute that forces individuals below the low pay threshold over time. Alternatively, individuals might be homogeneous and only differ for having experienced low pay in the past: in this case it is the experience of low pay that causes -per se -persistence, what is known as genuine state dependence (GSD henceforth). GSD might arise if low paid jobs induce human capital depreciation, so that low pay spells worsen the chances of finding better paid jobs in the future. Alternatively, GSD could arise when there is asymmetric information between job applicants and employers about the quality of the applicant, and prospective employers use applicants' earnings histories as proxies for their abilities, thereby making low wage offers to those who have been low paid in the past. Similar predictions could stem from other labour market models, such as labour supply -via a reduction of reservation wages for those who experience low pay -or 4 efficiency wages -through effects on morale and productivity. Besides shedding light on labour market functioning, distinguishing between heterogeneity and GSD is relevant for policy making. In the first case, policies targeted according to the factors causing persistence can reduce entrapment into low paid jobs. In the case of GSD policies targeted on 'problem groups' amongst the low paid might be misplaced and general measures such as minimum wages could be a more appropriate tool. The analytical framework developed in this paper allows to test for GSD and to quantify its incidence on overall aggregate state dependence.
The model of this paper encompasses those utilised by previous papers on earnings and income mobility. 2 In particular, it extends the analytical framework developed by Stewart and Swaffield (1999) for the assessment of initial conditions endogeneity by including two additional endogenous selection mechanisms, educational attainment and earnings attrition. The analysis of Stewart and Swaffield has shown that initial conditions are endogenous and that omitting them from models of earnings mobility biases inference about the impact of personal attributes in transition rates;
analogous conclusion have been reached by Cappellari (2002) by applying that model to Italian data. Models that study transition probabilities while controlling for the endogeneity of both initial conditions and attritions have been applied by Bingley et al. (1995) and Cappellari and Jenkins (forthcoming) to earnings and households income mobility, respectively, showing that exits from the sample are endogenous for estimating transitions and should not be ignored. Finally, despite the wide interest raised by the literature focussing on estimating returns to education in the presence of endogeneity, the issue is still unexplored in the context of earnings mobility, while one 5 could expect it to be relevant in this case if education has an impact on earnings growth rates. The present paper contributes at filling the gap.
Results confirm the necessity of allowing for the endogeneity of each of the three selection processes. In particular, I find evidence of negative sorting into education, i.e.
net of observable attributes individuals with higher education tend to have worse chances of moving out or staying out of low pay relative to the less educated, so that returns to education in terms of mobility increase once the bias is removed. Also, I show that GSD effects are important in shaping low pay transitions. By comparing these results with the ones retrievable by applying the models used in previous papers (which are nested within the model of this paper) I shed light on the consequences of alternative modelling choices.
Data and descriptive patterns of low pay transitions
The data used in this study originate from the panel component of the Survey on Households Income and Wealth (SHIW), administered by the Bank of Italy since 1977.
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Interviews have been carried out on an annual basis until 1987 and biannually afterwards, with the exception of 1997, when they were deferred to 1998. The sampling unit is the household, but detailed information is available also at the individual level.
Although originally designed as a repeated cross-sections sample, the survey includes a panel sub-sample since 1989. While initially fairly small, the proportion of panelhouseholds (i.e. households sampled in at least two consecutive waves) has increased in 6 recent waves, being approximately 40 percent since 1993; panel-households are selected randomly from the cross-sectional sample.
This paper utilises the four latest waves of the survey, 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000. Apart from the aforementioned limited size of the panel sub-sample before 1993, data limitations prevented the extension of the analysis to earlier waves. In particular, information on parental backgrounds has been introduced in the survey only since 1993.
As will become clearer later on, these variables play a crucial role in the econometric analysis, implying that the model cannot be estimated on waves preceding 1993. In addition, the structure of the questionnaire changed over time, in particular for what concerns labour market variables, and the selected waves provide a good degree of homogeneity in the available information.
I select full-time employees aged 18-55 if female and 18-60 if male who were not in full-time education and were members of households contributing to the panel subsample. The data enable identification of two two-year transitions (1993-1995 and 1998-2000) : Several definitions of low pay have been proposed by previous studies, with alternatives ranging from some legally set minimum pay (Smith and Varvricheck, 1992) to fixed proportions of median or mean earnings (Stewart and Swaffield, 1999) or to relative definitions based upon quantiles (Gregory and Elias, 1994; OECD, 1996) . Here I take the latter approach and, in particular, look at two different deciles in parallel, the second and the third, so that the robustness of results to the choice of a specific threshold can be assessed. for the third decile is 51 percent. The extent to which these figures reflect heterogeneity or GSD (see the discussion in the Introduction) will be investigated in the subsequent sections.
Rows 3 and 4 of the table break down low pay transition rates by level of educational attainment. Low pay persistence drops by roughly one third when comparing individuals with low (less that high school) and high educational attainment, whereas entry rates into low pay drop by nearly two thirds when moving from one subsample to the other. These figures suggest that the association between low pay transition and education is rather strong. However it is not possible at this stage of the analysis to attribute any causal interpretation to the result due to both observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
Row 7 of the table enlarges the sample by including also those employees who exit from the earnings distribution during the transition, thus considering the whole estimation sample for the model of the next section. The impact of this inclusion is substantive: 24 percent of those who earn above the low pay threshold in the starting year leave the distribution during the transition, and the figure rises to 40 percent when the initially low paid are taken into account, signalling that earnings attrition might be correlated with initial conditions. Overall, the average (over starting states) rate of exits from the distribution of earnings is approximately 27 percent. Additional insights on patterns of attrition from the earnings distribution are provided in row 8, where destination states of those who exits from the earnings distribution are specified.
monthly earnings are available upon request.
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Employees who start from low pay and exit the distribution are more likely to end up in part-time or self-employment, unemployment or to exit from the SHIW sample, when compared to workers initially high paid. Low pay jobs thus seem to be characterised by larger instability compared to high pay jobs; in particular, the evidence about entry rates into unemployment is consistent with the presence of cycles of low pay and unemployment as those singled out by Stewart (2002) for the UK. On the other hand, higher entry rates into retirement from high pay compared to low pay may reflect the life cycle of earnings.
The analytical framework
As discussed in the Introduction, the econometric analysis of earnings mobility entails various endogeneity issues. The current section lays out a model that allows estimating mobility equations while taking those issues into account.
A first bias has to do with the estimation of discrete dynamic processes from panel data on individuals, an issue known as the 'initial conditions problem' after the work of Heckman (1981a) . The issue arises since identification of transition probabilities requires to condition earnings states on their lagged values: as long as the earnings process is serially correlated and its starting values are unknown to the researcher, the unobservable initial condition will be present in earnings levels at each time period, making lagged states endogenous with respect to current ones.
While the initial conditions problem arises because of missing data before the start of the panel, a second endogeneity issue inherent to the modelling of earnings dynamics can be induced by missing data during the sample period, if attrition from the earnings distribution has some unobserved component that is correlated with unobservables of the mobility process. Earnings attrition can take place because of both panel attritioni.e. individuals leaving the survey from one interview date to another -or mobility out of employment: while not distinguishing between the two sources of missing data, the model of this paper makes due allowance for endogenous earnings attrition.
The two biases discussed above are due to the dynamic nature of the problem under investigation; a third bias might instead arise because of unobservable correlation between earnings mobility and measures of human capital that typically enter earnings equations, such as educational attainment. A vast literature has developed in recent years highlighting that factors like unobserved ability or family background might bias estimation of the impact of education on earnings (see Card, 1999) . While the emphasis of those studies is predominantly on the estimation of earnings levels, it might well be that endogeneity spreads to earnings transitions, as long as education has an impact on earnings growth rates, requiring an assessment of the issue also in models of earnings mobility.
The model
The earnings mobility model of this paper extends the one proposed by Stewart and Swaffield (1999) , where endougenous initial conditions were dealt with, by allowing for the endogeneity of earnings attrition and education. Earnings transitions are analysed by considering individual earnings states at two consecutive waves in year t-2 and t and pooling observations across the two transitions observed. The estimation sample is formed by individuals with valid earnings at the start of each transition.
Let l* it-2 denote a latent low pay propensity for individual i at the start of the transition and be a linear function of a set of observable attributes bundled in the 11 column vector x it-2 (with associated parameter vector β) and of a random variable u it-2 , assumed to be distributed as a standard normal:
Whenever l* it-2 exceeds some unobserved value (which can be set equal to zero without loss of generality), individual i is observed in low pay; let L it-2 =I(l* it-2 >0) be a dummy indicating that event. 6 Low pay probabilities at the start of the transition (i.e. the probability of initial conditions) can thus be expressed as Pr(L it-2 =1)=Φ(β'x it-2 ), where Φ() is the cumulative density function (c.d.f.) of the standard normal variate.
Next, let r* it indicate the individual latent propensity to persist in the earnings distribution between t-2 and t, specified as:
where w it-2 is a vector of personal attributes with associated parameter vector ψ and define R it =I(r* it >0). Low pay mobility can be observed only for those who remain in the sample at the end of the transition, i.e. if R it =1; the probability of that event is
The next process to be specified is educational attainment. One possibility would be to model years of education, which amounts at assuming that returns to educations do not vary with levels of educational attainment. Since the results of Brunello and Miniaci (1999) showed that in Italy returns to education significantly vary with the level of educational attainment, here I take an alternative route and consider a dummy variable signalling whether an individual has reached at least the high school degree, thus allowing returns to differ below and above high school attainment. By letting 12
denote a latent propensity to acquire education and S i =I(s* i >0) indicate attainment at least at the high school level, the probability of holding at least a high school degree can be written as Pr(
Low pay transitions probabilities can be analysed by specifying a relationship for year t low pay propensities conditional on year t-2 earnings states, retention and educational attainment:
where forced by the fact that the transition equation can not be observed for "earnings attritors", and the sample likelihood will be truncated in those cases. Defined L it the dummy indicator for year t low pay, current low pay probabilities will switch depending Estimation of cross-equation correlation coefficients provides the opportunity for testing the hypothesis of exogeneity of initial conditions, retention and education. In particular, the exogeneity of each of the three processes can be tested by testing that all correlation coefficients involving that process are jointly non significant, so that the corresponding equation can be ignored when estimating the model.
Identification
In order to aid model identification valid "instruments" are required in the form of variables that affect the selection processes but have no residual effect on earnings transitions. Heckman (1981b) suggests that information prior to labour market entry can be used as instrument for initial conditions. Since 1993 the SHIW has included questions on parental background, and I use a set of dummies for parental education as instruments for initial conditions. In addition, I follow Stewart and Swaffield (1999) and assume that the square of labour market experience, which enters equation (1), does not enter the low pay transition equation, given its interpretation of wage change equation. 7 Personal attributes in z it-2 are measured at the start of the transition so as to avoid simultaneity between changes in attributes and changes in earnings status. 8 Such an approach, based on the pooling of observations across transitions, is equivalent to the one of the pooled probit estimator discussed e.g. by Woolridge (2002, chapter 13). The approach yields consistent, though not efficient, parameter estimates, inefficiency arising from the violation of the independence assumption for those individuals who are observed in both transitions. I also experimented using a robust variance estimator that accounts for the presence of repeated observations on the same individual and find no relevant differences in results relative to those presented in the paper. Results obtained using the robust estimator are available upon request. 9 Including the square of experience in the transition equation did not produce statistically significant estimates of the associated coefficient.
The literature on panel attrition has indicated that variables such as the interviewer's opinion on the quality of the interview or the duration of the interview can serve as instruments for sample attrition (see Zabel, 1998) . The SHIW data report such information and the tests for instruments validity (see below) indicated that only the interview climate, as assessed by the interviewer, could be used for identification.
Variables such as the interview duration, the household's level of interest in the survey or its understanding of the questions were found to be significant in both the attrition 15 accumulation which are not relevant to explain earnings, after the impact of region of residence has been controlled for.
The validity of the identification strategy laid out above can be tested parametrically, using functional form as the identifying restriction.
State dependence
The structure of the model allows assessing the relevance of state dependence.
Aggregate state dependence can be computed from parameter estimates as the difference in average estimated transition probabilities between initial conditions:
providing the estimated analogues of the differences in conditional probabilities resulting from the transition matrices of Section 2. The null hypothesis of absence of genuine state dependence can be tested by testing that coefficient vectors in the conditional low pay equation do not differ across the low pay threshold,, i.e. the impact of personal attributes on current low pay is not affected by past low pay experiences:
H 0 : γ 1 =γ 2 . Such a test generalises the one usually adopted in dynamic random effect probit models (see e.g. Arulampalam et al., 2000) , where GSD is signalled by the significance of the coefficient associated with the lagged dependent dummy variable:
the generalisation consists in the fact that not only the intercept, but the whole parameter vector in the equation for current states is allowed to change depending on lagged states. Finally, an indicator of GSD may be derived as the difference in estimated transition probabilities an average individual would have experienced had she started 16 the transition from below or above the low pay threshold, the average being taken over the balanced sample of earnings recipients:
Note that since differences in transition probabilities are computed at the individual level, they do not reflect heterogeneity. Again, such a measure generalises the one used in dynamic probit models, i.e. the "marginal effect" associated to the lagged dependent dummy variable.
<TABLE 2 AROUND HERE> 4. Results Table 2 reports results obtained estimating the model of the last section on the SHIW sample, using alternatively the bottom quintile and the third decile as low pay cut-off Results tend to be stable across low pay thresholds, supporting the robustness of the conclusions drawn from the model to the choice of the cut-off point. The estimated cross-equation correlation coefficients provide insights on the significance and direction of the three potentially endogenous selection mechanisms. The correlation between unobservables of the initial conditions and retention equations (ρ 1 ) is negative and statistically significant, indicating a lower retention propensity among the initially low paid relative to the higher paid. The correlation coefficient linking initial conditions and the low pay transition equation (ρ 3 ) is also negative and significant, a result that already emerged in other studies of low pay transitions (see Stewart and Swaffield, 1999, and Cappellari, 2002) . Since this coefficient measures the correlation between unobservables of low pay levels and low pay changes, the negative sign can be interpreted as a symptom of Galtonian regression towards the mean. The correlation of unobservables between the retention and education equations (ρ 4 ) is positive and significant indicating that the highly educated are less likely to leave the earnings distribution relative to other employees, which might reflect both a stronger labour market attachment and a more stable membership of the SHIW sample. A positive and statistically significant correlation coefficient characterises unobservables in the education and transition equations (ρ 6 ). The sign of this latter coefficient indicates that the propensity to persist or enter low pay is higher among the highly educated, once the effect of observable attributes has been controlled for. The result is analogous to that of Brunello and Miniaci (1999) who study earnings levels and find that returns to education increase once endogeneity of education is allowed for (see also the discussion later in this section about comparisons of estimates from different models). The reason for returns to increase in their analysis is the sorting of less able individuals into the group with high educational endowment, which leads to underestimate returns when education is treated as exogenous and which is analogous to the higher conditional low pay probabilities found among the highly educated, net of observable attributes (i.e. ρ 6 >0). This would be true if, for example, liquidity constraints prevented able pupils from unfavourable family background to make their optimal schooling choices; also, as Checchi et al. (1999) point out, the Italian educational system, based on uniformity of the quality of education, might have failed to provide incentives to invest in education for those pupils. Table 2 . For each of the three processes, endogeneity emerges very clearly, the relevant correlation coefficients being jointly highly significant. Overall, the data indicate that the framework adopted in this paper is necessary for tackling the endogeneity issues inherent to the analysis of low pay transitions.
The next set of tests reported in Table 2 refers to the validity of instruments.
Parental backgrounds indicators, the interviewer's assessment of the climate of interview and the instruments for education are non significant in the transition 12 Note that the estimated correlation between low pay levels and education (ρ 2 ) is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Estimating an usual log-wage regression for year t-2 with endogenous educational dummy delivered a negative and significant correlation between the unobservables of education and earnings processes (ρ= -0.167, s.e.(ρ)=0.058) supporting the negative sorting interpretation. equation, while they appear to be strongly significant in the selection equations. Thus, the data support the validity of the variables selected as instruments.
Sample averages of estimated transition probabilities tend to replicate the aggregate figures shown in Table 1 . The associations between personal attributes and low pay transition probabilities are presented in terms of "marginal effects", see the Appendix for details on their computation.
13 Transition probabilities for the stylised individual used as reference in the computation of marginal effects tend to be considerably higher then the average rates. For each model, two columns of marginal effects are presented, the first referring to the transition from low pay to low pay (i.e.
based on parameter vector γ 1 ) the second referring to the transition from high pay to low pay (i.e. based on γ 2 ). Effects tend to go in the expected directions. For example, females have a probability of persisting or entering low pay which is higher compared to the one of males, between 5 and 16 percentage points. Also, labour market experience reduces conditional low pay probabilities. Education has a strong (causal) impact on transition probabilities: in particular, for the lowest threshold low pay persistence is some 29 percent lower for those who have reached a high school degree relative to those who have not, possibly reflecting the fact that for the highly educated even very low paid jobs can act as a port of entry into the labour market. Also, education has a beneficial effect in preventing drops into low pay from high pay.
Marginal effects associated to occupational qualifications also tend to have the expected negative sign, while their significance is considerably low for those who were initially low paid. The public sector dummy displays the same kind of asymmetric effect noted above for occupation dummies, while marginal effects for private sector industrial affiliation, on the other hand, do not reveal any clear pattern. Conditional low pay probabilities tend to be significantly lower for employees in medium sized private sector firms compared to small firms; when large size firm are taken into account the effect tends to vanish for those who start the transition below the low pay threshold. An asymmetric impact of observed factors on conditional low pay probabilities applies also for regional dummies, but this time in the opposite direction. For example, northwestern employees have a probability of low pay persistence that is 9 to 24 percentage points lower than that of workers from the South or Islands, while no significant differential characterises the probability of falling into low pay from higher pay. Finally, conditional low pay probabilities do not vary significantly over transitions.
Results about differences in the impact of personal attributes on conditional low pay probabilities depending upon the initial condition are consistent with the existence of GSD effects. A formal test for the absence of GSD (formulated as equality of parameter vectors in the conditional low pay equation) is reported at the bottom of Table 2 . For both low pay thresholds the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients across initial conditions is overwhelmingly rejected. Estimates of the measures of ASD and GSD introduced in Section 3 are also reported. GSD constitutes a substantial share of aggregate figures, the ratio GSD/ASD being around 38 percent for the lower threshold and 46 percent for the higher one. These figures are in line with the ones reported by Stewart and Swaffield (1999) for Britain. Test and measures of state dependence thence indicate that a relevant share of persistence may be ascribed to past low pay experiences, which modify individual tastes or constraints and make more difficult for individuals to move onto the higher part of the distribution, irrespective of personal attributes.
<TABLE 3 AROUND HERE>
Results from the endogeneity tests indicate that none of the three selection processes should be ignored when estimating low pay transitions. Insights on the consequences of ignoring endogeneity are provided in Table 3 , where results from the estimation of restricted versions of the model are presented, using the bottom quintile as low pay threshold. In particular, I focus on three models that have been estimated by previous papers on earnings mobility and which are nested within the more general framework of this paper. The first column considers the exclusion of the educational attainment equation, yielding the model utilised by Bingley et al. (1995) for earnings mobility and Cappellari and Jenkins (forthcoming) for income mobility. Exogenising education leads to a substantive drop in returns to education (in mobility terms), between 12 and 24 percent in absolute value depending upon the initial condition. Such a finding reflects the positive sign of ρ 6 in Table 2 : since the highly educated tend to have a higher unobserved propensity both persist or fall into low pay relative to the low educated, omitting allowance for the bias induces the observed reduction of marginal effects in absolute terms. The finding is in line with what Brunello and Miniaci (1999) reported from estimation of earnings levels equations for Italy. In economic terms, this result could be interpreted as evidence of liquidity constraints which prevent able individuals with unfavourable family background to make their optimal investment in schooling. The second column also excludes the retention equation, leading to the model of Stewart and Swaffield (1999) . The most notable difference relative to the model with exogenous education is the rise in size of marginal effects associated to 22 occupation, education and firm size in the low pay entry equation. Cross tabulations (not reported) show that individuals from non-manual occupations, with high education or working for larger firms are more likely to persist in the sample compared to manual or low educated workers from small firms, while Table 2 has shown that those who stay in the sample have larger conditional low pay probabilities relative to earnings attritors.
Thence, focussing on a sub-sample -i.e. the "balanced" one-with conditional low pay probabilities larger relative to those of the overall estimation sample leads to underestimate entry rates for groups with high retention propensities. The shift in the estimated ρ 3 (i.e. the Galtonian regression effect) relative to the full model can be interpreted in a similar way. The last column of the table excludes all selection equations, yielding a model of the type estimated, for example, by Contini et al. (1998) on Italian data, and confirms similar comparisons reported by Stewart and Swaffield (1999) : ignoring initial conditions endogeneity leads to overstate the impact of observed attributes on low pay transitions. Also, note that the estimated GSD/ASD ratio is now around 50 percent, a consequence of omitting any control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Concluding remarks
This paper has used data from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth to analyse the earnings mobility of low paid Italians. In particular models of low pay transition probabilities have been estimated while controlling for endogeneity of initial conditions, earnings attrition and educational attainment.
Results indicate that each of the three selection mechanisms is endogenous and should be properly controlled for. In particular, highly educated individuals are characterised by larger low pay persistence and entry rates relative to otherwise 23 identical workers, as could be the case in the presence of liquidity constraints that prevent able individuals from unfavourable family background to make their optimal schooling choices. As a consequence, ignoring endogeneity of education biases its returns (in terms of low pay mobility) downwards.
The analysis of the relationship between personal attributes and low pay transitions has shown that employees with low educational qualifications, female employees and southern workers have higher risks of being trapped into low pay. The probability of dropping into low pay appears to be associated with manual jobs and with jobs in the private sector metal-manufacturing industry and in small firms.
Results also indicate that state dependence effects play a relevant role in creating low pay traps: it is the experience of low pay which modifies the economic environment faced by individuals, increasing the probability of future low pay experiences irrespective -to some extent -of personal attributes. These findings suggest that entrapment into low pay may not be confined to 'problem groups' of the labour force, pointing towards the need of policies targeted on the whole pool of low paid employees.
Appendix: Likelihood contributions and evaluation of marginal effects.
The model of Section 3 is a four-variate probit with censoring and endogenous switching of one equation. The four equations, given in the text, are:
The low pay transition equation is truncated for observations that leave the sample between t-2 and t (i.e. when R it =0) and allows switching of the parameter vector of interest according to initial conditions.
Errors are assumed to be jointly distributed as four-variate normal with zero mean, unit variances and free correlation coefficients: (u it-2 , ε it , ξ i , v it ,)~N 4 (0, Ω).
Likelihood contributions take the following form: 
The effect considered is the one induced on transition probabilities by changes in the elements of z it-2 relative to the reference person described in the text. Note that such changes will, in general, also affect the conditioning events, therefore complicating the interpretation of the effects estimated. In order to circumvent those complications, I
fixed the probabilities of conditioning events at their sample averages, using the arguments of those average probabilities into the transition rates given in (A.6). Notes: Low pay defined as the bottom quintile of the earnings distribution. For each model, column headers indicate the initial condition. a) For explanatory variables marginal effects on conditional low pay probabilities relative to reference individual are reported; see text for computation. Asymptotic tratios in parentheses refer to the underlying SML or ML coefficient. Tests statistics are from Wald tests of hypotheses, P-values in italic b) SML estimator employs a GHK simulator with 75 random draws c) ML estimator d) Male, 20 years of potential experience, blue collar worker, private sector manufacturing, firm size <20, lives in the South or Islands, 1993-95 transition 
